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Abstract
This paper is devoted to the critical analysis of today's mainstream approach to the in­
clusion of the factor of culture in economic research. National culture is treated in this
framework as a reified entity measured by societal values and is persistently included
as a “culture code” throughout different contexts. The paper presents evidence contra­
dicting this treatment, and an alternative methodology for economic analysis of cultural 
phenomena is suggested, namely that each mass cultural practice should be analyzed on
a “case-by-case” basis, comparing stakeholders’ costs and benefits.
©2015 Non-profit partnership “Voprosy Ekonomiki”. Hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.
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1. Introduction
With the world economy beginning to recover from the crisis, understand­
ing the reasons for and the sources of growth, development and modernization 
has gained vital importance. The recession has highlighted the heterogeneity of 
the world economy and the diversity of reactions to change across countries. In 
some countries, the governments accepted the crisis as yet another manifestation 
of “creative destruction,” as an incentive to seek new approaches and capture
new opportunities. In other countries, eyes were fixed on the “glorious past,” 
and attempts were made to find the external enemies who had caused the down­
turn and to restore everything back to “the way it was.” Meanwhile, their own 
economic policies, which often aggravated the negative impact of changes in
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the global economy, were declared perfectly fit and sound and in no need of any
changes due to intrinsic reasons.
The classical theory of economic growth, rooted in the works of Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo, named three main growth factors, namely labor, capital (in­
vestments), and land (natural resources).1 the original set of factors was later 
expanded to include technology (Romer, 1986), institutions (Rodrik et al., 2004; 
Robinson et al., 2005), and culture (Licht et al., 2007).
It is the latter factor that is now interpreted by a number of researchers, writ­
ers and statesmen in Russia as the ultimate cause of the fundamental differenc­
es between the Russian economy and others. They stress the distinct nature of 
the Russian culture and the presence of a deeply rooted “culture code” within it 
that has remained unchanged for centuries and cannot be altered without the loss 
of national identity. From their point of view, Russia's “culture code” renders fu­
tile, and even harmful, any attempts in this country to apply any economic policy 
approaches and measures that have driven growth, development and moderniza­
tion in a large number of other economies.
We have put aside the purely ideological aspect of the so-called “civiliza- 
tional approach” and have instead focused on the scientific (theoretical and 
empirical) arguments in favor of the decisive influence of national culture on 
economic growth and development, and on the counterarguments stressing that 
culture— along with many other factors— does indeed influence the econo­
my, but does not predetermine its traits. In the following two sections, we will 
examine today’s prevailing, reified interpretation of national culture as a system 
of values and the role of the culture code as a mechanism that ensures its stabil­
ity. We have also critically reviewed the application of this interpretation in eco­
nomic analysis. In the fourth section, we will describe some facts that contradict 
this prevailing concept, and in the fifth section, we provide a brief description of 
alternative (holistic rather than value-based) interpretations of culture. The sixth 
section addresses the concept of culture as a popular practice and the resulting 
methodology of including the cultural factor in economic surveys. The final sec­
tion contains general conclusions from our analysis.
2. Culture as a system of values. Measuring and using culture in economic 
analysis
The concept of culture, although widely used across various branches of the so­
cial sciences, lacks a generally accepted definition. Whereas Alfred Kroeber and 
Clyde Kluckhohn (1952) found 164 definitions of culture in the mid-20th century, 
in the early 21st century, the number of definitions is now well in excess of 500 
(Kravchenko, 2000, p. 271). Up until the early 1980s, applied economic research 
had almost completely ignored the phenomenon of culture as an explaining or 
explained factor. The reason is quite obviously the lack of a sufficiently massive 
volume of data obtained via more or less valid measures. The situation changed 
after a publication by Geert Hofstede (1980), who not only suggested operation­
alizing culture as a system of societal values but also completed a comprehen-
1 The perception of natural resources as a pillar o f economic growth was shaken by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew 
Warner (Sachs, Warner, 1995).
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sive international survey that provided a basis for the dimensions of national
culture and enabled quantitative comparisons between countries. During the later
period, the value-based understanding of (national) culture became almost uni­
versally accepted. Culture measurement efforts were enhanced with new inter­
national projects that began to accumulate large statistical databases (Inglehart 
et al., 2004; Schmitt et al., 1993; House et al., 2001). In our opinion, the general 
acceptance of Hofstede’s approach by researchers is primarily because it enables
a transition from a purely qualitative to a quantitative analysis of the relationships
between culture and other domains of economic, social and political life.
Hofstede interpreted culture as the “collective programming of the mind
which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from
another” (Hofstede, 1991, p. 4). This programming is carried out through so­
cializing members of a group and raising them under a certain system of values
defined as “broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others” and 
which form the “key element of culture” (Hofstede, 1991, p. 35). At the same 
time, Hofstede himself drew a distinct line between individual and societal 
values, characteristic of a group (category) as a whole that distinguish it from
others: “There is hardly an individual who answers each question exactly by
the mean score of his or her group: the ‘average person' from a country does not
exist” (Hofstede, 1991, p. 253).
Accordingly, societal culture is seen as a statistical average based on indi­
vidual “broad tendencies” to prefer certain situations over others, but identified 
through forming and interpreting clusters (“dimensions” of culture). Having pro­
cessed several tens of thousands of individual responses, Hofstede identified five 
dimensions of societal cultures:
• power distance (PDI) (high/low);
• uncertainty avoidance (UAI) (high/low);
• individualism/collectivism (IDV);
• masculinity/femininity (MAS);
• long-term orientation (LTO) (high/low).
Authors of alternative measurement systems for societal cultures are mov­
ing in the same direction, though their use of different primary question­
naires yields other “dimensions” of cultures at the level of national (country) 
societies. “The common method for measuring psychological constructs is to 
ask individuals to provide self-reports on their attitudes, values, or behaviors. 
When averaging these reports, we will get an estimate of the average level of 
that particular psychological construct within the chosen group” (Fischer, 2006, 
p. 1420). The general acceptance of this approach, however, does not eliminate 
significant problems that arise when attempts are made to interpret the aforemen­
tioned statistical averages (and more complex ones, such as clusters, principal 
components, etc.) as characteristic of some entities, existing independently apart 
from the individuals whose estimates and judgments are reflected in the initial 
measurements.
The main methodological problem is connected to the high sensitivity of av­
erages to source data. This may lead to a situation where the interpretation of 
the economic calculations using them as variables would be heavily dependent 
on the sampling parameters underlying those averages. Here are some examples 
of this problem.
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The first example addresses the conclusions made by Ronald Inglehart and 
his colleagues (Granato etal., 1996), who analyzed theconnection between 
“materialistic” and “post-materialistic” values and economic growth. Based on
a sample of 25 countries, they showed that the cultural attitudes of achievement2
and thrift have a positive impact on economic growth, whereas prioritization on
“post-materialistic” values has a negative impact in the long term. However, 
later calculations by Edwards and Patterson (2009) and Hanson (2009) showed 
that these relations and impacts are sensitive to the sample composition as well 
as to the time period in question, i.e., they actually represent artifacts rather 
than real dependencies.
The second example also addresses studies by Inglehart and his colleague 
Christian Welzel (Inglehart and Welzel, 2006). Their theory of consistent human 
development, which became highly popular among modernization theorists 
and statesmen, asserts the precedence of economic development, which leads 
to cultural changes, i.e., changes in the system of values that, in turn, enable 
the democratization of a society. The authors base their logic on a statistical 
analysis of relevant data from countries representing 85% of the world popu­
lation. However, a later analysis of practically the same data, conducted by 
Victoria Spaiser et al. (2014), who used their own new approach that they called 
“Bayesian Dynamic Systems” (Ranganathan et al., 2014), revealed a different 
sequence of changes, i.e., human rights protection and democratization precede 
the rise in the relevance of emancipation values, such as personal autonomy and 
gender equality. Moreover, research has shown that, following the development 
of human potential in a country, the first thing to increase is the level of demo­
cratization, followed by emancipation (individual freedoms). These changes 
only occur after the Human Development Index (HDI) has exceeded a certain 
threshold. The analysis also showed that a higher level of emancipation sets 
a wealth growth limit for a society; i.e., after reaching a high level of democra­
tization and freedom, societies seem to look for a certain equilibrium that would 
not support further economic growth.
It should be stressed that the two examples above are not there to prove 
Inglehart's concepts wrong but to demonstrate that the use of average statistical 
characteristics of societal cultures in econometric macro-analysis requires careful 
attention to the research methodology, including the choice of variables (culture 
measures) and processing techniques.
Thethird example is an illustration of this requirement. Judit Kapas (2014), 
noticing the unsatisfactory results from measuring culture based on the level of 
generalized trust3, studied the relationship between individual values and econom­
ic development based on data from the Schwartz Values Survey. A multi-country 
analysis revealed that the individual values measured according to Schwartz have
2 Attention was drawn to the relationship between “achievement motivation” and economic growth in 
a book by David McClelland (1961), though its appealing conclusions failed to demonstrate empirical proof 
(Beugelsdijk and Smeets, 2008).
3 This sounds perfectly plausible because the level of generalized trust in a country is determined primarily 
by the quality o f formal institutions, as demonstrated by a number of empirical studies (Beugelsdijk, 2006; 
Rothstein, Stolle, 2008; Herreros, 2012). Consequently, generalized trust cannot serve as a suitable dimension 
of culture and/or informal institutions existing in a country, but is used as such nonetheless (see Tabellini, 2010; 
Williamson, 2009, and others).
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no impact on economic development, provided that the quality of formal institu­
tions is controlled. This differs from the results obtained for different value indica­
tors (the cultural index built around Inglehart’s World Values Survey measures and 
a different level of individualism, measured according to Hofstede), which suggest
that values do have an impact on economic development.
As we can see, finding a solution to the key problem of the entire branch of
macro-analysis of cultural impacts on economic development depends on which 
dimensions of culture are employed in econometric analysis.
3. Reification of culture and the culture code
The above problems, which arise when dimensions of societal culture are used
in macroeconomic analysis4, are apparently rooted in the interpretation of culture 
that underlies those dimensions, as an independent entity existing apart from in­
dividuals.
Two approaches to understanding national culture have co-existed and com­
peted ever since the dawn of scientific cultural research. One of them, dating 
back to Edward Tylor (1871) and Alfred Kroeber (1917)5, viewed culture as 
a superorganic entity, coherent and holistic. The other, developed by Bronislaw 
Malinowsky (1926)6, treated culture as a sum of fragmented and controversial 
processes taking place in, and integrated into, a society. The first approach ef­
fectively means a reification of culture, deeming it to be a “thing” separate from 
human beings, endowed with its own substance and independent existence. 
The first approach has spawned a phenomenon in popular science called cultural 
determinism, which views culture as the driving factor behind most, if not all, 
social — and economic — processes. The second is built around culture as an es­
sential part of human activity, deriving from it. Our study does not aim to analyze 
the development of these approaches, the arguments for and against them, etc., as 
those matters belong to anthropology and cultural science. We, on the other hand, 
are focused solely on the implications of adopting the views above in a methodo­
logy for studying the impact of national (societal) culture on economic processes.
The holistic concept of culture and the deterministic approach prevail in contem­
porary economic research (McSweeney, 2009; Taras et al., 2010). This seems to be 
the result of the general application of Hofstede’s data and findings, or, rather, their 
explicit and implicit interpretation by his followers and opponents.7 In fact, Hofstede 
himself does not consider societal culture — as a system of values — to be separa­
ble from individuals, which is clearly revealed in the title of his article “Dimensions 
do not Exist...,” where “dimensions” referred to the five cultural dimensions listed 
above (Hofstede, 2002). Nevertheless, according to a recent publication by Shalom
4 Similar problems occur at the micro level, when cultural indicators are used in management research. 
Unfortunately, the format of this article does not allow us to dwell on this subject.
5 Culture is “that complex whole which includes the knowledge, beliefs, arts, morals, law, customs, and any
other capabilities and habits acquired by a human as a member of society” (Tylor, 1871, p. B; quote from Soares 
et al.,2007).
6 “...human cultural reality is not a consistent or logical scheme, but rather a seething mixture of conflicting 
principles” (Malinowski, 1926, p. 121; quote from McSweeney, 2009).
7 According to M. Morris, the reason why this approach is more common lies deeper. It is the “human brain’s 
hardwired capacity for essentialism” (Morris, 2014, p. 14).
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Schwartz, societal culture is the “hypothetical, latent, normative value system that 
underlies and justifies the functioning of societal institutions. As such, culture is 
external to individuals” (Schwartz, 2014, p. 5)8.
Reified culture must be stable over time. Indeed, according to Hofstede,
“cultures, especially national cultures, are extremely stable over time... Differences
between national cultures at the end of the last century were already recognizable
in the years 1900,1800, and 1700, if not earlier. There is no reason they should not 
remain recognizable until at least 2100” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 34-36). The empirical
evidence of this statement is, to say the least, controversial. The literature is actu­
ally abundant with evidence indicating that changes in societal cultures take quite
a long time (see their review, e.g., in Schwartz, 2009, p. 3). At the same time, evi­
dence of rather rapid changes in cultural values also exists (Fais, 2003; Dmáková, 
2006, etc).
The holistic (civilizational) interpretation of culture invariably encounters
the issue of identifying the sources of their stable nature and reproduction in
time, as well as the origins of differentiation between cultures.9 Indeed, the be­
havior representative of a person's culture and the socio-economic environment 
in which that person acts are constantly undergoing change. The literature cites 
several such sources (and mechanisms): institutionalization (Zucker, 1977), i.e., 
the emergence of external enforcement mechanisms to ensure conformity with 
certain behavioral practices that were previously followed solely at the discretion 
of their subjects; imitation (Bryson, 2009), or individual training, made possible 
by the so-called “mirror neurons” in the human brain (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 
2004); and the modular system o f cognitive mechanisms “embedded” in the mind, 
allowing basic perceptions of the world, its design, etc. to be passed down through 
generations (Sperber and Hirschfeld, 2004). The reasons for differences between 
stable cultures can be found in the concept of multiple equilibria (Cohen, 2001).
In our opinion, the first of the above mechanisms is the most relevant, while 
the second and third, being based on the genetic traits of the human brain, per­
form a broader function than ensuring the lasting quality of cultures. Although 
the mechanism of institutionalization10 admits the concept of societal culture as 
a set of norms rather than a system of values, this fact does not diminish its 
explanatory role. Although the stability of social norms themselves has genetic 
(neural) roots (Buckholtz and Marois, 2012), an estimation of the (relative) sta­
bility of cultures fully relies on the (relative) stability of the norms.
This explanation, however — for some presumably ideological reason — is 
found unconvincing by a number of researchers who seek other bases of cultural 
stability. An analysis indicates that, in addition to explicit factors, there are im-
8 It should be noted that Schwartz believed societal culture to be characterized primarily by values shared by 
the members o f a society and by the level of value consensus between individuals (Schwartz, 2006; Schwartz 
and Sagie, 2000).
9 These are evidently not primary issues for the alternative, “process-based” interpretation because no borders 
are created between cultures, whereas cultural processes intersect and intertwine. According to this concept, 
in an aggregate cultural process, stable entities do not actually exist “on their own" but rather are defined 
by researchers (including amateurs, i.e., the very individuals who ponder on their differences from “others,” 
forming their stereotypes of others which usually turn out to be inaccurate or simply incorrect see: Terracciano 
et al., 2005).
10 The term “institutionalization” is more characteristic of the language of social science than that of economic 
theory, which traditionally deals with the emergence or formation of institutions.
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plicit ones, which must be identified based on the context. The first group in­
cludes Kirdina’s “institutional matrices X and Y”11; the second includes the con­
cept of the “culture code”.
It should be noted that the expression “culture code” has two different mean­
ings, a semiotic and ajoumalistic one. The semiotic interpretation of culture code 
views it as a “‘mesh' that culture ‘throws over' the world to classify, categorize, 
structure and evaluate it” (Krasnykh, 2002, p. 232). In other words, a culture 
code is the knowledge of an individual derived from her being familiar with 
the phenomena of a culture, enabling her to interpret various external phenomena 
(natural as well as social) as signs conveying sense and meaning. Thus, in most 
Western countries, white color symbolizes purity, whereas in India it is the color 
of mourning. According to Abraham Moles, “we can call a ‘code’ anything that is 
known beforehand to both the sender and recipient of a message above the set of 
signs” (Moles, 1973, p. 130). Following from the above, a semiotic culture code 
is the overall knowledge of a group enabling (but not requiring) its members to 
interpret (understand) various things, qualities and relations as signs in a similar 
manner. Different culture codes explain the numerous cases of misunderstand­
ing between people whose “background” knowledge does not match. It is easy 
to eliminate these misunderstandings through direct communication to enhance 
the knowledge of both parties.12
The secondjoumalistic sense of the term “culture code” is closest to the sys­
tem of societal values, as seen from an analysis of related contexts. For exam­
ple, the comment made by the Finmarket news agency concerning a study of 
the impact of values on the behavior of firms towards assuming risks (Finmarket, 
2012; Mihet, 2012) was entitled “Russia’s culture code hindering its modern­
ization.” Aleksey Verizhnikov, in reconstructing Russia’s culture code based on 
pop song lyrics, though referring to the semiotic interpretation of culture code 
by Clotaire Rapadle (2006, p. 5), phrased his conclusions in terms close to 
Hofstede’s dimensions (masculinity/femininity, delinquency/senility, hyperac- 
tivity/apathy) (Verizhnikov, 2008). In a dialogue between Andrey Konchalovsky 
and Alexander Auzan, the concept of culture code is also expressly connected to 
a set ofbasic values characteristic of a society (country) (Gusarova, 2015).13
However, if a culture code is just a doubling of the concept of societal cul­
ture, shouldn’t it be the focus of attention? Should we speak about the myth of 
the “culture code,” etc.? We believe we should because it is the culture code con­
cept that best underlines two aspects of great theoretical and practical signifi­
cance. The first is the decisive influence of culture on the course of almost any 
significant social, economic and political process in a country (nation). The sec­
ond is the integrity and invariability of culture as a result of the invariability of 
its culture code. In other words, the concept of the culture code is a variation on 
the concepts of cultural determinism, which practically signifies the futility of 
any attempts to change the status quo, i.e., to “go against one's culture code.”
11 A detailed critical review of Kirdina’s approach is presented in an article by Bessonova (2007) and does not
require a separate analysis here.
12 For a functional analysis o f the semiotic culture code, see Enfield (2000).
13 An article by Maxim Trudolyubov (2013) contains a broader review of thejoumalistic usage of the term
“culture code”.
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4. The integrity and decisive nature of societal culture?
Recently, Alberto Alesina and Paola Giuliano conducted comprehensive re­
search to implement the ideas of cultural determinism based on an extremely
broad meaning of culture, identifying it with an aggregate of informal institutions
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2014). A number of Russian scholars share a similar view 
(Yasin, 2007, 2014; Lebedeva, 2007; Lebedeva and Tatarko, 2009; Medvedeva 
and Medvedev, 2010; Auzan et al., 2011; Nifaeva andNekhamkin, 2013).
However, if culture determines nearly everything in various societies, from 
the political system to the fine parameters of the financial sector, what deter­
mines the parameters of culture itself within a country? Although predetermining
the opportunities and limitations of development in an economy, is any culture 
truly a homogeneous monolith that has an effect on people irrespective of their
will and consciousness? Facts indicate the contrary.
Let’s start with a bold thesis about the “clash of civilizations” advanced by 
Samuel Huntington (1993). Thecomprehensive statistical analysis of changes in
the level of human rights protection in different civilizations, recently carried out
by Wade Cole (2013), found little proof of this thesis, especially where it predicts an 
aggravation of social conflict related to Western human rights standards. The end of 
the Cold War also turned out to be of little significance for human rights protection 
practices in countries classified as representing different civilizations, which direct­
ly contradicts the arguments of Huntington. Based on data gathered between 1989 
and 2007, from 20 countries representing 55% of the world population, Uz (2015)
demonstrated that although the gap between Western and non-Western cultures had
indeed widened somewhat during that period, this did not mean that they were mov­
ing in opposite directions. Both moved in the same (Western!) direction. The speed
of the one was merely faster than that of the others.
To what extent do societal cultures predetermine the values of the individuals
“belonging” to them? There is empirical proof that country-specific “all-cultur­
al” factors account for as little as 2% to 4% of the variance in individual values 
(Green et al., 2005; McSweeney, 2009 et al.), which is why it would be incorrect
to argue that societal culture predetermines individual values. Ronald Fischer
and Shalom Schwartz confirm this in their research demonstrating that individual
values “associated with autonomy, relatedness, and competence show a univer­
sal pattern of high importance and high consensus [between individuals]” in all
countries and cultures studied (Fischer and Schwartz, 2011, p. 1127). Studies by 
Charles Helwig (2006) point directly at the limited extent of cultural influence
on individual development.
Moreover, an empirical analysis showed that the contrast of cultures as indi­
vidualistic and collectivist, regarded as absolutely fundamental by most research­
ers and practitioners, is in fact misleading. Proceeding from the evolutionist
concept of culture as a mechanism for adapting to the surrounding environment,
Daphna Oyserman et al. (2002, p. 110) found that “depending on situational re­
quirements, both individualism- and collectivism-focused strategies are adaptive;
thus, it is likely that human minds have adapted to think both ways.”
The inner heterogeneity of societal cultures can be seen in the example of dif­
ferent cities (Plaut etal., 2012) and regions within the same country (Talhelm 
etal.,2014).
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Important observations were made about the interaction between culture and
business behavior. For example, Barry Gerhart demonstrated that most varia­
tions between corporate cultures are not explained by differences between na­
tional cultures as measured by Hofstede and the GLOBE indices (Gerhart, 2008a, 
2008b). A highly representative (as of 2005) review of research projects aimed at
identifying the connections between characteristics of national cultures and vari­
ables describing different aspects of organizational behavior (Tsui et al., 2007) 
shows that no generalization has been achieved in this field so far. At the same 
time, the research that had been completed up to that point had identified a con­
siderable number of special, local dependencies, which are undoubtedly of 
interest in the context of our article. Finally, we should not forget to mention
the investigation into the correctness of identifying culture measured by societal
values within the home country of the firm in question (Sawang et al., 2006). 
Having studied the behavior of employees at firms in Australia, Singapore and 
Sri Lanka, the authors came to the conclusion that a country (nation) and a set of
societal values are not the same thing and cannot be treated as interchangeable 
in statistical analysis.
The results of empirical research (the number of papers in this field is much 
greater and we can only name a few) demonstrate quite unambiguously the fol­
lowing:
(a) national cultures are heterogeneous and cannot be considered as uniform, 
whole systems (of course, if we do not follow Schwartz in arguing that cultures 
exist independently from people); and
(b) their parameters (societal values) do influence but do not predetermine 
the behavior of individuals and firms.
With regards to a methodology for including culture as a factor in economic 
analysis, this means that the reified interpretation of culture, inherent in most 
research papers on the subject, is not the best measure for it.14 the occasional 
remarks by researchers that value-based dimensions of culture should be used 
because “they are simpler to measure” and because there are available databases 
are not convincing. Data about an individual's weight are undoubtedly easier to 
obtain than data about their IQ. Moreover, an individual's weight is an indirect 
reflection of his/her IQ because obesity does not generally suggest powerful in­
tellect (except in the case of endocrine diseases). Nevertheless, no researcher 
ventures to use weight as a measure of intellect. On the practical side, it means 
that recommendations regarding which economic activities “correspond” to 
a country’s culture and which do not (and thus should not be attempted)15 lack 
a scientific basis.
Thus, taking into account the heterogeneity of groups (particularly societies, 
national populations, etc.), using societal values to explain the behavior of par­
ticular individuals and firms within a country—because it is they, together with 
external factors, that predetermine the condition of an economy — would result
14 An extensive critique of the value-based concept o f societal culture is provided by Morris (2014).
15 The well-known conclusions by Hofstede provide an example: countries with masculine cultures have 
efficient mass production, heavy industry and base chemistry; countries with feminine cultures should engage 
in custom production, individualized services, agriculture and biochemical production; where the avoidance of
uncertainty is not clearly manifested, innovations are bound to bring success, whereas high-precision production
will prosper in areas where it is strong, etc. (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005, p. 240).
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in the so-called “ecological fallacy” (Brewer and Venaik, 2014) of attributing
statistical parameters and ratios existing at the level of a group to each element 
of that group.
Another important fact proving the irrelevance of the value-based inter­
pretation of culture for economic analysis is that values do not directly influ­
ence behavior, as vividly illustrated through the famous natural experiment 
by Richard LaPiere (1934). Thepattem “values action,” popular among 
social psychologists decades ago, has long since transformed, due to the ef­
forts of many researchers, into a pattern easily comprehended by economists: 
“values constraints actions,” whereby the phenomena serving as constraints 
vary across different models, from all types of norms (Cialdini et al., 1990) to 
the so-called self-efficacy, i.e., an individual’s confidence that she has enough 
resources and abilities to achieve her objectives (Bandura, 1977). Societal cul­
ture (cultural context) is also one of the intermediaries between values and ac­
tions, constraining (and sometimes determining) various acceptable behaviors 
(Roccas and Sagiv, 2010). Accordingly, it comes as no surprise that even in areas 
such as religion, a coincidence of faith, beliefs, values and actual behavior is 
more the exception than the rule (Chaves, 2010).
5. Alternative interpretations and dimensions of culture
Our previous argument suggests that a reification and value-based measure­
ment of culture prevents the cultural factor from being correctly included in eco­
nomic analysis. This calls for outlining other concepts of culture.
Shinobu Kitayama has been a consistent critic of culture as an entity with values 
as key components. He noted that the generally accepted method of measuring 
culture and attitudes may register the situational reactions of respondents but not 
the deep structures of the conscious and subconscious. Accordingly, the assump­
tion that a set of values identified in this way predetermines the behavior of indi­
viduals would be groundless. In Kitayama’s opinion, a systemic concept of culture 
as “a dynamic system that is composed of many loosely organized, often causally 
connected elements — meanings, practices, and associated mental processes and 
responses” is more realistic (Kitayama, 2002, p. 92). Thus, a “system view of 
culture explicitly acknowledges that all psychological processes and mechanisms 
are potentially available for all peoples and cultures” (Kitayama, 2002, p. 93).16 
Apparently, the systemic concept of culture effectively makes it similar to “enu- 
merative” definitions, characterized by the intricacy of measurement, thereby pre­
venting this concept from being employed in economic research.
As noted above, an alternative to the reified concept of culture can be found 
in the process-based concept, which is similar to enumerative interpretations in 
some respects, but different in that the process-based concept focuses on pro­
cesses, i.e., sequences of actions, changes, etc. We will dwell on this concept in 
the final section of this article and will try to link it to the new methodology of in­
cluding culture as a factor in economic analysis. In this section, we will consider 
other alternatives to the value-based measurement of national cultures.
16 D. Oyserman et al. (2014) adopt a similar view, underlining the stochastic (rather than determinant) nature
of relationships between cultural universals and behavioral actions.
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Social axioms approach suggested by Kwok Leung et al. (2002) is based
on the assumption that cultures differ in how people perceive the structure of
the world around them. Although values represent situations (states) evaluated 
as desirable or undesirable, social axioms represent relationships between an in­
dividual and the world, as well as those within the (social) world. An analysis of 
empirical data identified five generalized “dimensions” of this concept:
• social cynicism: either a negative or a positive attitude toward human nature;
• social complexity: certainty about either a single way or multiple ways to 
achieve something;
• rewardfor application: certainty (or lack thereof) that “life-long” hard work is 
rewarded;
• religiosity: either belief or disbelief in the existence of the supernatural;
• fate control: belief in either a predetermined nature of events in life or in 
the opportunity to define one’s own trajectory in life.
An empirical analysis has shown that social axioms possess a considerable pre­
dictive ability, especially in situations where a future action depends on the sub­
ject’s idea of how others would react to it (Kurman, 2011). That makes this ap­
proach similar to the concept of culture as an aggregate of descriptive norms (see 
below).
Each of the “dimensions” above consists of a number of “special” axioms, 
the list of which is not yet complete, as with the list of “dimensions” themselves. 
For example, quite recently a new social axiom, supported with empirical evi­
dence, was proposed as a separate dimension, i.e., certainty that social relations 
are a zero-sum game where somebody's win invariably means somebody else's 
loss (Rózycka-Tran et al., 2015). Evidently, the presence or absence of such cer­
tainty is potentially significant in all domains of life, from getting along with 
one's neighbors to international relations.
The scarcity of country-specific empirical data prevents (temporarily, we hope) 
the use of this approach in economic analysis. One should not make the ecologi­
cal fallacy here, which is also true for any macro measurement of culture.
Tightness and looseness of culture. This approach, developed by Michele 
Gelfand et al. (2006), proposes evaluating national culture based on the rigidity 
of social norms and penalties for breaching them. This indicator is manifested at 
all levels, i.e., the society as a whole, various institutions and individual behavior, 
and has an impact on a broad spectrum of economic and social phenomena and 
processes. For example, it has been shown to have an effect on differences in 
understanding the phenomenon of leadership in various countries (Dickson et al., 
2012), and the level of discretion in actions by company management (Crossland 
and Hambrick, 2011), etc. The only objection to this approach is that tightness and 
looseness do not so much characterize culture as they do the entire institutional 
environment of a country, including all of the laws and regulations introduced by 
the state. This raises doubts regarding thejustification for combining the rigidity 
of the proper norms with the rigidity of enforcement mechanisms used to ensure 
obedience into a single characteristic: as experience shows (even in Russia), rigid 
norms may be followed selectively, i.e., not rigidly.
Culture as an aggregate of intersubjective perceptions. Unlike the two ap­
proaches above, this branch of cultural studies lacks integrity and even a common 
terminology. The general theme is an interpretation of culture as an aggregate of
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perceptions held by the “members” of a culture, concerning the values and beliefs
prevailing in that culture. If those perceptions fit, they are considered “intersub­
jective” rather than individual. Chi-Yue Chiu et al. (2010, p. 482) defined inter­
subjective perceptions of culture as “beliefs and values that members of a culture 
perceived to be widespread in their culture.” This definition stands very close to
the concept of descriptive norms, i.e., the perception of members of a group about
behaviors that, in their opinion'1, are characteristic of (widely common among) 
its other members in various situations. This is how Fischer et al. (2009) sug­
gest interpreting individualism/collectivism. The advantage of this understanding 
of culture is seen by its advocates in the formidable explanatory power of norms 
(Shteynberg et al., 2009), which is difficult to contest (Rimai and Real, 2003). 
However, the intersubjective approach faces at least two problems, i.e., how do 
“members” of a culture identify its other members and how (in what form and 
where) do intersubjective perceptions exist (Fischer, 2012). The lack of a convinc­
ing solution to these problems seems to preclude any discussions of future ap­
plications of this approach. The expansion of the concept of enhancing cultural 
values with norms (albeit in the twisted form of “intersubjective perceptions”) is 
undoubtedly one of its strong points.
Thus, we have completed our brief overview of the non-value-based measure­
ment of cultures as entities and will now move on to describing a fundamentally 
different understanding of national culture.
6. Culture as a form of activity and economic analysis
Probably one of the more general interpretations of culture is “any behaviour 
routinely acquired from conspecifics by non-genetic means. The qualifier ‘rou­
tinely’ implies that this is behavior shared by some significant subset of an adult 
population” (Bryson, 2009, p. 78).
As a mass phenomenon, non-genetically determined behavior also appears 
to be repetitive (in certain situations), which makes it resemble the notion of 
practice. In understanding the latter, we agree with Reckwitz (2002, p. 249), who 
argues that a practice is a “routinized type of behaviour which consists of several 
elements, interconnected to one other: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental 
activities, ‘things' and their use, a background knowledge in the form of under­
standing, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge.”
The relevance of practices in research on social (including economic and po­
litical) processes was recently stressed by Christian Bueger (2014, p. 386), who 
highlighted the fact that they reflect both explicit and tacit knowledge possessed 
by individuals. This is why they are ontologically anterior to the various struc­
tural components of communities such as institutions, societal values, etc.
The understanding of culture as a common activity17 8 or as an aggregate of prac­
tices does not mean that culture is only about practices. By consciously or sub­
consciously processing the information they receive, the subjects of practices— 
individuals —create certain generalizations, world models, social axioms, etc.:
17 O f course, this opinion may be incorrect (see Miller, McFarland, 1987).
18 By paraphrasing the name of an article by 0yvind Dahl (2014), we can say that culture is not what people
have but what they do.
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“We view culture as a socially interactive process of construction comprising two
main components: shared activity (cultural practices) and shared meaning (cul­
tural interpretation). Both components of cultural processes are cumulative in na­
ture since they occur between, as well as within, generations” (Greenfield et al., 
2003, p. 462). However, it should be stressed that the “higher” cultural levels often 
highlighted by researchers (Erez and Gati, 2004) may differ between their actual
content and how they are perceived, which can be observed through mass creators
of culture, obscuring the explanatory potential of those “higher” levels.
The difference between the value-based (and other reified) and activity-based 
concept of a group (community) culture may be described in a metaphor: ac­
cording to the former, a group culture is an intersection of individual cultural ac­
tivities (practices, including semiotic ones), whereas according to the latter, it is
their union, including all of the “higher” constructs possessed by and exchanged
between individuals. Because a consensus (as an intersection) can be established 
with respect to a relatively small number of values and other constructs (Wan 
et al., 2010), culture as a consensus presents a very “poor” description of the di­
verse values and other constructs of individuals “belonging” to the same culture.
According to Kemmelmeier and Kühnen (2012, p. 171), the “temptation is strong 
to treat culture and cultural differences as a ‘thing’. However, research in cultural
social psychology and related disciplines has demonstrated that culture is better 
thought of as a process.”
The interpretation of culture as an aggregate of values and practices and their
underlying constructs (and other information) faces the problem of separating cul­
ture (and cultural practices) from other branches of societal life, e.g., the economy. 
One of the traditional answers to this challenge was formulated by Clifford Geertz 
(1973, p. 14; quote from Schudson, 1989, p. 153): “culture is not a power, some­
thing to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally 
attributed; it is a context, something within which they can be intelligibly—that is, 
thickly— described.” Building upon this idea, Michael Schudson (1989, p. 153)
himself wrote: “the question of the ‘impact' of culture is not answerable because
culture is not separable from social structure, economics, politics, and other fea­
tures of human activity.” Evidently, these evaluations refer to culture as a certain
whole rather than its individual phenomena or components.
In our opinion, cultural practices can be separated from other practices. This
separation isjustified by so-called cultural universals, i.e., types of actions pres­
ent in all human communities that ensure that the basic function of culture is to 
adapt these communities to the changing environment and ensure their survival 
(Murdock, 1945; Brown, 1991; Buss, 2001 etal.). Cultural universals (thelist 
of which may vary) are related to culture as aggregates of non-genetically pre­
determined types of behavior, whereas the ways and forms of realizing cultural 
universals, i.e., different practices adopted by a community, represent the proper 
cultures o f those communities. In other words, the cultures of communities (in­
cluding national cultures) are identified through their non-functional qualities and 
are distinctive in their characteristics, which are insignificant for the functioning 
of human culture as a whole, i.e., adaptation to the external environment. For 
example, this approach is fully consistent with practical research in archeology, 
where cultures are distinguished according to their non-functional qualities, i.e., 
ornaments on pottery, hatchwork on stone tools, etc.
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In general, the process-based concept of culture sees it as an evolving “constel­
lation of loosely organized ideas and practices that are shared (albeit imperfectly)
among a collection of interdependent individuals and transmitted across genera­
tions for the purpose of coordinating individual goal pursuits in collective living”
(Chiu et al., 2011, p. 4). Obviously, this concept automatically solves the problem 
of measuring reified culture because there is no reification.
In this case, how can the phenomenon of culture be integrated into economic
research? We believe that an alternative to the now dominant approach can be
found in a “case-by-case” analysis of the effect of cultural phenomena (in relation 
to popular cultural practices) on economic processes. An example is presented 
in research on the economic consequences of the “lobolo” custom, common in 
South Africa (Ansell, 2001). The custom requires that the bride’s family be paid 
considerable sums, whether in money or in kind, similar to the custom called 
“kalym,” which is widespread in Turkic communities. This type of analysis, 
while being quite positive, also provides a basis for regulatory recommendations, 
depending on the total costs and benefits for all of the stakeholders.
Similar examples can be found in abundance, but the one above illustrates 
the substance of the suggested approach quite well: in analyzing the effects of 
cultural phenomena on the economy, the focus should first of all be (relatively) 
popular cultural practices, i.e., those popular in a particular group of individuals 
such as hired workers, small businessmen, regional politicians, etc.
7. Conclusion
As Thomas Friedman commented on relations between the economy and cul­
ture, “to reduce a country's economic performance to culture alone is ridiculous, 
but to analyze a country's economic performance without reference to culture is 
equally ridiculous, although that is what many economists and political scientists 
want to do” (Friedman, 2007, p. 562). The problem is how culture should be inte­
grated into economic analysis. This article has the objective of demonstrating that 
the explanations of macro, meso and micro characteristics of economies based 
on the fiction of reified societal culture manifested in a “culture code” are, at 
the very least, unproductive (unless we use Friedman’s evaluation “ridiculous”).
A more productive way to study the phenomenon of culture is on a “case-by­
case,” “institution-by-institution” basis, evaluating the impact of each particular 
cultural phenomenon on economic processes rather than their aggregate because 
all available “aggregate” dimensions are structured in a way that does not allow 
the separation of cultural influences from that of formal institutions (from values 
to trust). Accordingly, one cannot speak about measuring a whole culture, rather 
than an aggregate institutional environment, without finding a convincing way to 
separate one from the other, which is usually impossible. Thus, we can say that es­
tablishing an econometric relationship between any parameters of a societal culture 
and particular macroeconomic variables signifies a problem that should be scruti­
nized through microeconomic research to identify which cultural phenomena cause 
macroeconomic consequences and what mechanisms are used in the process.
Of course, a component-by-component, case-by-case analysis of the effect 
of cultural phenomena on the economy will not lead to great discoveries (such 
as “culture rules” or that “the culture code gets in the way of modernization”),
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though it does provide excellent opportunities for a positive empirical analysis of 
the ways particular traits of human nature affect various economic processes at 
various levels across the scale, from micro to macro.
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